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Article
Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots
and Common Effects of U.S. and E.U. Privacy
Regulation
PIERLUIGI PERRI AND DAVID THAW
Much legal and technical scholarship discusses the differing views of the
United States and European Union toward privacy concepts and regulation. A
substantial amount of effort in recent years, in both research and policy, focuses on
attempting to reconcile these viewpoints searching for a common framework with a
common level of protection for citizens from both sides of Atlantic. Reconciliation,
we argue, misunderstands the nature of the challenge facing effective cross-border
data flows. No such reconciliation can usually occur without abdication of some
sovereign authority of nations, which would require the adoption of an international
agreement with typical tools of international law. In this Article, we explore an
alternative means to achieve effective data interchange governance among the
Western nations, arguing that the focus for addressing privacy issues created in
cross-border data flows should instead be procedural, rather than substantive.
Beginning with the observation that both U.S. and E.U. cultures share a
common fear of “chilling effects” infringing various rights to privacy, we link the
differences in privacy fears to the comparative views of the role of the state. These
differences are instructive in that while they limit the potential for substantive
harmonization of privacy goals, they also create substantial opportunity for
procedural harmonization.
Such procedural harmonization would afford many benefits, reducing
transaction costs for multi-national organizations and increasing the probability
that individuals can express (and rely upon implementation) of their privacy
preferences The result is a system we describe as Market-Supervised Regulatory
Delegation, in which the substantive differences among nations can be respected
and implemented in an international market for expressing privacy preferences that
is not distorted by the overhead of competing compliance regimes.

1621

ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1623
I. DIFFERENT ORIGINS OF U.S. AND E.U. FEDERALISM AS
CAUSES OF DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF PRIVACY VALUE . 1624
A.
B.

BRIEFLY ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
1626
BRIEFLY ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION ........................................................................................... 1630

II. DEFINING THE IDEA (NOT THE LAW) OF PRIVACY FOR U.S.
AND E.U. CITIZENS: SIMILITUDES AND DIFFERENCES.......... 1633
A.
B.
C.
D.

THE CONCEPT OF “CHILLING EFFECTS” ........................................ 1633
OVERVIEW OF U.S. PRIVACY REGULATION .................................. 1635
OVERVIEW OF E.U. PRIVACY REGULATION .................................. 1639
U.S. – E.U. SHARED COMMITMENTS ............................................. 1644

III. COMMON GROUND IN U.S. AND E.U. BUREAUCRATIC
ORGANIZATION: UNIFYING PRIVACY REGULATION—
“MARKET-SUPERVISED REGULATORY DELEGATION” ......... 1647
A.
B.
C.

FEDERATED REGULATION (MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATORY
DELEGATION) ............................................................................... 1648
FEDERATED REGULATION SUPPORTS NATIONAL COORDINATION
TOWARD HARMONIZED PRIVACY PROCESSES............................... 1649
FEDERATED REGULATION FOR STANDARDIZING COMPLIANCE BY
REGULATED ENTITIES ................................................................... 1651

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION ........................................ 1652
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 1654

Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots
and Common Effects of U.S. and E.U. Privacy
Regulation
PIERLUIGI PERRI AND DAVID THAW *
INTRODUCTION
The idea that the U.S. and E.U. have different perceptions about privacy
values is widespread. When describing the U.S. view, much scholarship
starts from Warren and Brandeis’ Article, The Right to Privacy, which
presents a view of “the right to be let alone” very different from common
European perception of privacy.1 This focus on substantive difference,
however, overlooks other differences that may explain why these two
contemporary western cultures developed such different views of the right
to privacy. This Article compares the differing perceptions of privacy
through the lens of causation, tracing those perceptions’ roots along with the
development of the administrative state in each region. The privacy
“worries” resulting from violations of the two different perceptions are, in
fact, quite similar in quality and differ not in the resultant fear but rather in
the respective societies’ views of the role of regulation.
Contemporary examinations of privacy law in the United States and the
European Union focus predominantly on the substantial differences between
these regulatory regimes and the strength of protection they afford. This
comparative view correctly describes the different actors with which each
regime’s privacy protections are concerned: the U.S. regime fears intrusions
by the State, whereas the E.U. regime fears intrusions by private
corporations, especially so-called Big Data corporations. The traditional
view, however, is incomplete because it overlooks a critical commonality
between the two regimes—the shared fear of what bad actions the “privacy
*
Pierluigi Perri is an Associate Research Professor of Advanced Computer Law at Università degli
Studi di Milano (University of Milan). David Thaw is an Assistant Professor of Law and Information
Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh. Both authors are Affiliated Fellows of the Information Society
Project at Yale Law School, and their names are listed in alphabetical order. This Article has been
produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this Article are the sole
responsibility of Pierluigi Perri and David Thaw, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the
European Union. The authors are grateful for the support of The European Studies Center at the
University of Pittsburgh, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. The authors also thank the Università degli
Studi di Milano for its support of this work. This Article benefitted from the thoughtful commentary of
Jack Balkin and Guido Calabresi.
1
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193,
206 (1890) (describing the evolution of recognized personal rights, particularly, the “right to be let
alone”).
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intruder” will take. Specifically, while each regime fears different actors—
both are concerned about the “chilling effects” on individual freedoms that
would result from privacy invasions.
The common values inherent in both United States and European Union
privacy regulation, and in their associated bureaucratic institutions, provide
clues to developing a framework for coordinating these two different
regulatory regimes. Such coordination has many benefits for international
data flow, which has become a fact of modern life. Multi-national
organizations, for example, handle vast amounts of data and compliance
with different regulatory procedures can be highly inefficient. The
application of Management-Based Regulatory Delegation theory, or
“Federated Regulation,” can allow individual states to maintain their
autonomy with respect to substantive privacy values while reducing
compliance costs by coordinating procedural regulatory processes. Such an
approach is possible because of the common shared fear among U.S. and
E.U. States—that privacy invasions, regardless of their source, will
ultimately lead to chilling effects on individual action.
The resultant approach, which we describe as Supervised Market-Based
Regulation, allows for an international regulatory framework which both
shows respect for national differences in privacy preferences while allowing
for harmonized compliance procedures which reduce barriers to free flow of
information and discourage compliance-avoidance activities.
I. DIFFERENT ORIGINS OF U.S. AND E.U. FEDERALISM AS CAUSES OF
DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF PRIVACY VALUE
This Section explores the different ways in which the federalist systems
of the U.S. and E.U. affect perceptions of privacy. Views of the State as
instrumentalist in Europe (fearing unrestrained private action) and views of
the State as self-limiting in the U.S. (fearing unrestrained state action) accord
with the classic fears each society's government seeks to restrain. These
views still predominate modern political discourse and, we argue, translate
into modern conceptions of the role of privacy regulation in the two
respective societies.
U.S. political discourse focuses far more on concerns regarding privacy
intrusions by state actions than it does on privacy intrusions by private
corporations. E.U. political discourse, by contrast, focuses far more on
privacy intrusions by private corporations than does U.S. political discourse.
Furthermore, notwithstanding substantial political disagreement among U.S.
states and regions, and among E.U. member states, the two comparative
dimensions described above are among the few aspects of privacy about
which there is agreement within each respective culture. U.S. states and
regions generally agree that unrestrained federal power threatens privacy,
and E.U. members states generally agree that unrestrained capitalism
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threatens privacy.
In this regard, the U.S. and E.U. irreconcilably differ as to who are the
“feared privacy invader(s).” U.S. culture “fears” government invasion and
specifically protects against it,3 looking to the private market as an
instrument to protect privacy choices. E.U. culture “fears” invasions by
private corporations (sometimes referred to as “imported capitalism”
especially as respects U.S. technology companies) and looks to Data
Protection Authorities as instruments to issue guidelines or even binding
regulation that protect privacy choices4.
These irreconcilable differences make substantive convergence between
U.S. and E.U. privacy regulation deeply problematic. Even if recent
responses by E.U. governments to national security and terrorism events
were to raise fears of privacy invasion by national governments, as some
have recently observed,5 such a choice would do little to suppress fears of
private corporate action. The fundamental difference regarding the
instrumentalities of preference expression and free-choice preservation
would remain.6
Curiously, however, each of these two societies shares a common fear—
the result that will manifest as consequence of failing to protect against
violations of individuals’ privacy. Each society shares the belief that privacy
invasions, or perhaps more importantly perceptions of risk of privacy
invasions, will deter individual action and expression creating the
normalizing effects predicted by Foucault.7 A particularly salient example
of this shared fear is highlighted by responses on both sides of the Atlantic
2
Such a distinction is not unsurprising, particularly in the privacy context, considering the social
and historical roots of American and European societies as placing greater value on “individualism” and
“order and rank” respectively. William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
959, 965–966 (2016).
3
E.g., U.S. Const, amend. IV; William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment. Origins and Original
Meaning, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS. (2009). See also, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95
(2014); see also generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial Data on Governance
Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529, 1644–1648 (2013); Francesca Bignami,
Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data
Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 2, 441–457 (2011).
5
See
The
Terrorist
in
the
Data,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
26,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21679266-how-balance-security-privacy-after-paris-attacksterrorist-data (discussing digital privacy concerns following the implementation of new security
programs after the Paris attacks).
6
It is important to note that the distinction drawn here, and throughout this Article, is not that
European citizens are unconcerned with State-based privacy intrusions. Quite the opposite: after World
War II, many (now) EU nations implemented specific safeguards against such intrusions in their
respective codes. Rather, instead, what we distinguish here is the current primary focus of unaddressed
(or under addressed) privacy concerns of the respective polities in contemporary society.
7
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–01 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (exploring a hypothetical society where public perception
of “permanent visibility . . . assures the automatic functioning of power”).
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in recent years to bulk data collection through classified government
surveillance programs.8 This shared concept of “chilling effects”9 gives hope
that while substantive convergence in transatlantic privacy regulation is
unlikely, perhaps these limited shared values might facilitate procedural
harmonization in privacy regulation.
It is useful, at this point, to briefly trace the histories of the
administrative states in the U.S. and the E.U., focusing on their respective
fears of unrestrained state action and unrestrained “imported capitalism,”
and then examine how the commonalities within the respective regulatory
systems make possible a form of procedural harmonization when viewed
from the perspective of the shared desire to prevent chilling effects on
individual action.
A. Briefly about the Administrative State in the United States and the
regulation of privacy
The concept of the administrative state—if contemplated at all by the
Framers during the Constitutional Convention—was at most a side thought
viewed as wholly manageable by a single Chief Executive.10 What was
clearly at the forefront of the Framers' concerns was a deep-seeded fear of
the encroachment of individuals' freedoms by the State. This fear was
evident in the references to substantial dissatisfaction with and concern
about the arbitrariness of the British monarchic system.11
In forming the new Republic, the Framers’ fear of state privacy invasion
was also evident in debates regarding the division of power between the
federal and state governments. While reservation of the power to state
governments might be interpreted as not fearful of governmental abuse, both
historical argument and structural analysis suggest otherwise. First, as a
structural matter, the giving over of power to a national government was a
more lasting and difficult-to-alter proposition for the citizens of the late
1700s than was maintaining their individual state governments. John
DeWitt's Letter of October 27, 1787 calls for caution and notes that the
powers of that new government will not be reconstituted annually, but are
designed to endure perpetually and thus calls upon his fellow citizens to
8
See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C.L. REV. 609, 680 (2007).
9
See Yoan Hermstrüwer & Stephan Dickert, Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on
Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten, MPI COLLECTIVE GOODS PREPRINT, No. 2013/15 (2013).
10
See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–93 (1987) (“If in 1787 such a merger of
[governmental powers and] functions was unthinkable, in 1987 it is unavoidable given Congress’s need
to delegate at some level the making of policy . . . .”).
11
See RALPH KETCHMAN, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES 1–6 (1986) (discussing the Framers’ dissatisfaction with the British monarchy
and attempts to form a better government).
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exercise great care in considering its adoption. In particular, DeWitt notes
“[t]hat insatiable thirst for unconditional control over our fellow creatures .
. . produced the first Bill of Rights ever prefixed to a Frame of
Government.”13 The position DeWitt represents, however, did not view the
Bill of Rights as a complete solution:
The people, although fully sensible that they reserved every
title of power that they did not expressly grant away, yet afraid
that the words made use of, to express those rights so granted
might convey more than originally intended, they chose at the
same moment to express in different language those rights
which the agreement did not include, and which they never
designed to part with, endeavoring thereby to prevent any
cause for future altercation and the intrusion into society of
that doctrine of tacit implication which has been the favorite
theme of every tyrant from the origin of all governments to the
present day.14
This language so aptly conveys the fears of many at the time—that the
greatest threat of intrusion into individuals’ personal lives was the
government, and that it was viewed not primarily as an instrumentality to
achieve ends, but rather this purpose was secondary and government's power
a necessary evil to provide for certain other common goods, such as national
defense and international trade.
In their well-known casebook Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and Professors Stewart,
Sunstein, Vermeule, and Herz provide a compelling overview of the
development of the administrative state in the United States.15 Their
overview provides insight into the U.S. view as fearful of the state and
placing greater trust in free markets to regulate activity rather than viewing
the state as an instrument to limit the encroachment of individual freedoms
by market actors. They divide this overview into temporal periods, which
can be summarized in five transitions: (1) English antecedents and the
American experience to 1875; (2) 1875–1930: the rise of regulation and the
traditional model of administrative law; (3) the New Deal through 1965: the
Administrative Procedure Act & the maturation of the traditional model of
administrative law; (4) 1965–1985: critique and transformation of the
administrative process; and (5) 1985–present: retreat or consolidation (the
modern period).16
12

Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
14
Id. at 196–97 (emphasis added).
15
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY 15–29 (7th ed.
2011).
16
Id. at 15–29.
13
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From the earliest days of the Republic until the present day, a consistent
theme is present of reacting with hesitant and concern to expansion of the
administrative state. In addition to the discussion above, Breyer's
observations about the early periods highlight key quotes from The
Federalist:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.17
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . On the
slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are
by no means totally separate and distinct from each other.18
These quotes, as with those discussed earlier, highlight the early fears
the Framers had concerning state power. As the administrative state began
to develop in the late 1800s and early 1900s, scholars differed as to whether
it preserved or encroached upon the separation of powers viewed so
necessary at the founding but generally viewed it with a cautious eye.19 Even
the effects of the Great Depression and World War II were insufficient to
shift permanently the American skepticism of concentration of power.
Congress begrudgingly hammered out the Administrative Procedure Act in
the 1940s as a compromise designed to limit agency power in the wake of
several wartime and post-Depression expansions of administrative power.20
By the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the trend had again swung fully toward
limiting agency power as “[a]gencies were no longer viewed as clinicians,
17

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 2009).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271–72 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 2009).
19
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609 (1984) (discussing the “general worrying about the relationship of
the Presidency and administration” following the Civil War).
20
See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.) (governing the way in which federal administrative agencies may propose and
establish regulations); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42
(1935) (“In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws . . . is
virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935) (holding
that the section of the National Industrial Recovery Act in question was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power because it did not provide clear guidelines to the executive); J.W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404–08 (1928) (holding that a congressional delegation of power
under the Tariff Act was not unconstitutional).
18
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and social policies were no longer viewed as amenable to correct
solutions.”21 While social policy did advance at the legislative level during
this period, agency skepticism remained, leading to substantial divisions
between agencies and those they regulated.22 Since the 1980s and through
the present day, debate continues between formalists who believe in strict
adherence to separation of powers out of fear of concentrated state power
and functionalists who believe that some ground must be given to allow a
complex society to function. In both cases, however, scholars, judges, and
legislators recognize the dangers of concentration of power and view the
administrative state with a cautious eye, at best accepting its power as a
necessary evil. This differs substantially from the receptive European
viewpoint where instrumentalist views of the role of the bureaucratic state
and related European regulatory agencies receive more open welcome,
particularly given the complexities of the modern, internet(worked) world.
Notwithstanding this view of the state, however, some concern with
private action “bleeds over” from restraints on the State to restraints on
private action. This is particularly true when the concern regarding harms
flowing from state action involve the suppression of speech or expression.
For example, in 1968 Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Wiretap Act provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
which amended 18 U.S.C. § 2511 to prohibit “any person” from
“intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept [] any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”23 Katz v. United States24 had overturned many years of
telephone surveillance jurisprudence under Olmstead v. United States25 and
many years of public concern regarding surveillance activities by U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement agencies as noted in the Church
Committee Report.26 As noted in the Church Report, “Katz explicitly left
open the question . . . [of] whether or not a judicial warrant was required in

21
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1761 (2007).
22
See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 348–50 (2014)
(providing examples of agency rulemaking failures resulting from the exclusion of some regulated parties
in the rulemaking process).
23
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
24
389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (holding that law enforcement use of an eavesdropping device to
intercept the telephone conversation of a criminal suspect, without a judicial warrant, was an
impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment).
25
277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the installation and use of a wiretapping device by law
enforcement to monitor the telephone conversations of criminal suspects without first procuring a warrant
did not amount to an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment requiring suppression of the acquired
evidence).
26
See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 670, 686 (1976) (discussing concerns of J. Edgar Hoover that the
public would react adversely to learning of the FBI’s “mail opening” technique).
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cases ‘involving the national security.’”
In response to concerns regarding government surveillance, Congress
included Title III (the “Wiretap Act”) in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
Act.28 As noted by the Church Report, “the issue of ‘national security’
wiretaps, which was left open in Katz, was similarly avoided [in Title III].”29
Interestingly, however, the Wiretap Act's breadth was not limited in scope
to Government action. It specifically included “anyone” in its prohibition
against wiretapping. This law, and many similar state analogs,30 remains in
effect today as a bulwark against suppression of expression by surveillance
conducted both by the government and by private actors.
B. Briefly about the Administrative State in the European Union and the
regulation of data protection
The European Union, by contrast, is not a real federalist state like the
U.S. Quoting from a very important judgment of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ):
The [European] Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the States have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and
the subjects of which comprise not only member States but
also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of
member States, community law therefore not only imposes
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as
upon the member States and upon the Institutions of the
Community.31
It is not clear, in fact, what is “new” in the European Community, from
a legal point of view.32 According to some scholars, it can be viewed as a
27

Id. at 288.
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Laws on Recording Conversations in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/LAWS-ON-RECORDINGCONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf (stating which jurisdictions require getting consent of the person or
persons being recorded).
31
Case 26-62, N,V, Algemene Transport: en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (Feb. 1963) (Neth.) (reference for a preliminary ruling:
Tariefcommissie).
32
On these issues, see also Ugo Pagallo, La TUTELA DELLA PRIVACY NEGLI STATI UNITI
D’AMERICA E IN EUROPA 111–113 (Giuffrè ed., 2008) (It.).
28
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multi-level constitutional system, for others it can be viewed as a sort of
federalism à la European,34 or a variation of the Medieval jus commune,35 or
a form of standard organization for the International Law.36
Besides the difficult classification of European federalism, it is
interesting to note that the E.U. is a union of states and citizens with wellidentified limits to the central authority. In fact, looking at E.U. legislative
activity, member states are not inclined to welcome regulations which have
immediate legal force for individuals within the member states, preferring
instead the use of Directives, which need to be transposed in national laws
to be fully effective in every single state.37
The difficulties of qualification of E.U. administrative state did not
prevent the member states from striving for a common vision of privacy
regulation among the states. This was clear since the beginning of Directive
95/46/EC, which defines a set of objectives that must be achieved by single
state law and aims to create a common framework between the Member
States.38 After almost twenty years of existence of the Directive, the E.U.
faced that the implementation of the objectives with single state law created
“a fragmented legal environment which has created legal uncertainty and
unequal protection for data subjects.”39 Thus in January 2012, the European
Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data protection rules,
putting the completion of this reform as a policy priority.
The objective of this new set of rules is to return control of personal data
to citizens, and to simplify the regulatory environment for businesses.
In fact, the data protection regulation is a pillar of the E.U. strategy for
creating the so-called Digital Single Market, which aims to remove the
barriers for Europeans when using online tools and services. The entire
33
See Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European
Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON L. MARKET REV. 703, 707 (1999) (Neth.) (defining a multilevel constitution as a “constitution made up of the constitutions of the Member States bound together
by a complementary constitutional body consisting of the European Treaties [].”).
34
See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 24 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1999)
(describing the constitutional system among the European Community).
35
See H. Coing, Von Bologna bis Brussels: Europäische Gemeinsamkeit, Gegenwart und Zukunft,
Kölner Juristische Gesellschaft, IX, Bergish Gladbach-Köln, 1989.
36
See Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible
Foundations, 37 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 389, 396–97 (1996) (discussing how the case law of the ECJ shows
an evolution and adoption of treaties as a constitution).
37
See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN Union 214 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (explaining how member
states pass Directives which require legislative action to become fully effective within that state).
38
See Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
461, 467–469 (2000).
39
Viviane Reding, The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century, 2
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 119, 121 (2012).
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strategy is focused on creating an area of trading which could contribute
€415 billion to the European economy, boosting jobs, growth, competition,
investment and innovation.
Thus, there are strong economic basis behind this reform, which is
composed of two legal texts: the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)40 and the Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or
the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data.41
The GDPR will be applicable starting in May 2018 and will have a
tremendous impact on data protection regulation.
Another step of the Digital Single Market strategy is about
cybersecurity, which is often connected with data protection issues. In this
sense, the Network Information Security Directive, as stated by the
European Commission, will provide legal measures to boost the overall level
of cybersecurity in the E.U. by ensuring:
x

Member States preparedness by requiring them to be
appropriately equipped, e.g. via a Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) and a competent national NIS
authority;

x

cooperation among all the Member States, by setting up a
cooperation group, in order to support and facilitate strategic
cooperation and the exchange of information among member
states. They will also need to set a CSIRT Network, in order to
promote swift and effective operational cooperation on specific
cybersecurity incidents and sharing information about risks;

x

a culture of security across sectors which are vital for our
economy and society and moreover rely heavily on ICTs, such
as energy, transport, water, banking, financial market
infrastructures, healthcare, and digital infrastructure.
Businesses in these sectors that are identified by the member
states as operators of essential services will have to take
appropriate security measures and to notify serious incidents to

40
See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L. 119/1)
(explaining that one example is the recent decision to remove roaming costs by 2017 between the
European mobile phone operators).
41
Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offenses or the
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/911/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L. 119/89).
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the relevant national authority. Also key digital service
providers (search engines, cloud computing services and online
marketplaces) will have to comply with the security and
notification requirements under the new Directive.42
In a message from July 5, 2016, the European Commission “encouraged
Member States to make the most of NIS coordination mechanisms” and
signed an agreement with members of the cybersecurity industry to better
equip Europe against cyber-attacks and to strengthen the competitiveness of
its cybersecurity sector—creating a contractual Public-Private Partnership
(cPPP)—which is expected to drive further market-oriented policy measures
in the forthcoming months.43
II. DEFINING THE IDEA (NOT THE LAW) OF PRIVACY FOR U.S. AND E.U.
CITIZENS: SIMILITUDES AND DIFFERENCES
This Section builds on the comparative analysis of the administrative
state in the U.S. and E.U., translating those differences into a framework for
understanding the origins of privacy regulation in each society and
investigating what commonalities might exist. Using a perhapscontroversial approach to define privacy not starting from the premise of
existing law, but rather from the premise of what are the underlying
historical concerns, it proceeds to identify that the two respective privacy
regulatory frameworks share a common fear of privacy invasions as
“chilling,” or deterring, certain actions by individuals. The frameworks
diverge, however, with respect to with which actors each society seems most
concerned will engage in such invasion.44 Following from the discussion in
Section I, this Section argues that U.S. privacy regulation focuses on chilling
effects of state action, whereas E.U. privacy regulation focuses on chilling
effects of (private) corporate action.
A. The Concept of “Chilling Effects”
“Chilling Effects” is a much celebrated concept in jurisprudence and
scholarship in the United States, especially related to the First Amendment.45
It describes a condition in which invasions of privacy or the fear thereof
42

The Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive),
EUR.COMMISSION (July 28, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/network-andinformation-security-nis-directive.
43
Id.
44
It is worth nothing that multiple scholars have observed that the U.S. and E.U. perceptions of
privacy also diverge in their concept of privacy as an “exclusionary” versus a “fundamental” right, and
in the degree to which that right is a political decision or a Constitutionally-binding choice. Such
distinctions, while quite important, are orthogonal to the argument of this Section, which focuses on the
historical similarities of “fear against invasion” inherent in both societies’ views of privacy.
45
See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”,
58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978).
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cause individuals to change their behaviors, abstaining from otherwiselawful activity not because of its proscription by society but out of fear of
public association with that activity. This concept is a value shared by many
societies around the world and provides a starting point from which to
identify more specific normative values regarding privacy shared among
U.S. and E.U. nations.
The concept of “Chilling Effects” is defined by two characteristics: (1)
that individuals perceive there is at least a risk of their activity or condition
being observed by another who may disseminate those observations; and (2)
that individuals change their behavior—discontinuing or hiding that activity
or condition—out of fear of public association with that activity or
condition.46 This formulation suggests a means of identifying shared
intrinsic privacy commitments among nations whose extrinsic (expressed
through law) privacy commitments may differ widely.
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize
chilling effects as a sufficient ground for a violation of constitutional
rights,47 while in the E.U. the European Court of Human Rights, the
European Court of Justice and many state courts have recognized many
times that the possibility of undisclosed collection and storage of personal
identifiable information can create a danger for fundamental rights,48 but
despite this, the E.U. courts have been in general reluctant to recognize
chilling effects when people give their consent to data processing.
A recent study, however, has shown that there is a risk that people will
experience a chilling effect when consenting to the disclosure of personal
identifiable information, intending the chilling effect “as an increased
propensity to comply with social norms.”49 Both the increase in societal
46
See Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment Legal Scholars, Wikimedia Foundation v. Nat’l
Security Agency, 143 F. Supp. 3d 344 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2015) at 3, 8–9,
http://www.margotkaminski.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/085-001-Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-FirstAmendment-Legal-Scholars-1.pdf; see also id. at 362 n.27 (recognizing the importance of “chilling” but
rejecting that as adequate to establish standing); see also generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S.
398 (2013); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972).
47
See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 418 (noting the plaintiffs could not establish standing by claiming
they experienced a chilling effect that resulted from a governmental policy); Laird, 408 U.S. at 3
(rejecting the complaint of a “‘chilling effect’ on the exercise of the First Amendment rights where [the]
effect is [] caused . . . only [by] the existence . . . of intelligence gathering”).
48
See, e.g., Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t. v.
Tom Watson et al., Joined Cases 203/15 and 698/15 ECJ (2016) (emphasizing the importance of
protection of the right to privacy and confidentiality with respect to the processing of personal data) and
Bărbulescu v. Romania, application no. 61496/08 ECtHR (2017) (emphasizing that communications in
the workplace are covered by the concepts of “private life” and “correspondence” protected by Article 8
of the European Convention of Human Rights).
49
See Yoan Hermstrüwer & Stephan Dickert, Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on
Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten 3 (Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 5, 2013).
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recognition of chilling effects and the acknowledgement (if not doctrinal
acceptance) by high courts in both the U.S. and E.U. suggest that, from a
political compatibility standpoint, the two societies share concern for the
implications of chilling effects. The shared historical antecedents of “feared
invasion” into (private) seclusion, discussed in more detail in Section I,
suggest that adequate shared privacy commitments exist across the Atlantic
to examine harmonization efforts on that basis.50
Identifying shared intrinsic privacy commitments, therefore, lends
weight to two essential arguments of this Article: (1) that procedural
harmonization is a plausible goal; and (2) that trusting the market—through
delegation of compliance details to regulated entities—is reasonable given
these shared commitments.
B. Overview of U.S. Privacy Regulation
This subsection provides an overview of Constitutional, statutory, and
other privacy protections in the United States. The next subsection similarly
overviews parallel protections in the European Union. Subsection D then
compares these two regimes to demonstrate the plausibility of procedural
harmonization.
1. Constitutional Protections
There is no express privacy right in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, there
are effective rights that derive, either directly or indirectly, from the
protections afforded by the Amendments in the Bill of Rights. Direct
derivative rights are those which necessarily flow from the express
provisions of the Bill of Rights. For example, a privacy interest in one’s
person, residence, and certain other excludable property flows from the
Fourth Amendment.51 Indirect derivative rights are those the courts have
recognized as necessary corollaries to the privileges afforded by the Bill of
Rights Amendments. A privacy interest in one's associative activities, for
example, has been recognized in certain contexts as flowing from the First
(and Fourteenth) Amendments.52 A general privacy interest in the “marital
bedroom” has been recognized as flowing indirectly from a collection of
50

See supra Section I.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State”);
Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance
Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. 177,
183–84 (2011) (discussing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
52
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (stating that there is immunity from
state scrutiny of membership lists under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, applying the First
Amendment protections to “associate freely with others” to action by individual states under the
Fourteenth Amendment and holding that Alabama failed to demonstrate a “controlling justification for
the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate”).
51
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several of the Bill of Rights Amendments.
These provisions share all concern restraints on government action, as
opposed to a general privacy interest. At a general level, however, they
implement three substantive privacy commitments (if only against certain
actors): (1) a privacy interest in residential (and similar) spaces; (2) a privacy
interest in one's own body; and (3) a privacy interest in state-recognized
marital relationships.
2. Federal Statutory Protections Concerning Government Processing
of Information (the Privacy Act of 1974)
The Privacy Act of 1974 places obligations on most elements of the U.S.
federal government which process information records describing
individuals.54 It limits the government from disclosing information from
systems of records absent express consent of the individual or if the
disclosure falls into one of a list of enumerated statutory exceptions. It is the
only (non-sector specific) privacy law of general applicability imposing
affirmative duties on a data processor in the United States, but is limited
solely to (federal) government actors. On a general level, the Privacy Act
implements a substantive commitment to the privacy of non-public
individuals’ information acquired by government systems, but only as it
pertains to the federal government as a data processor and subject to several
exceptions. Additionally, the Privacy Act only applies to government
agencies, and not to the courts, legislature, or non-agency executive entities.
The Act thus provides limited input describing potential shared substantive
privacy commitments, however it does indicate a receptiveness in the United
States to the concept of a general information processing privacy law as
pertained the “feared actor” (the state) in the United States.
3. Federal Sector-Specific Statutory Provisions
Many industries are subject to sector-specific regulation in the United
States, but two stand out prominently in the privacy context. Both the
healthcare and finance industries have comprehensive legislation requiring
both specific actions by regulated entities and requiring those entities to
develop (and adhere to) compliance plans for managing substantive privacy
commitments and the information security measures that implement those
commitments. Financial entities are covered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA)55 and healthcare entities are covered by the Health Insurance

53
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (asserting that marriage is a “right
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”).
54
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a)
(summarizing when the privacy of an individual is directly affected).
55
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804, 6805 (2012).
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Notably, as Thaw describes
elsewhere, both these statutory frameworks utilize a form of ManagementBased Regulatory Delegation.57
These two statutory frameworks—both of which apply to private
actors—implement general substantive commitments to privacy in two
specific information areas: (1) medical/healthcare information; and (2)
personal financial information.
4. Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provisions
In additional to affording protections for information in specific
substantive areas, such as that processed by healthcare and financial
industries, U.S. federal law (and some U.S. states) afford statutory
protections to information conveyed via certain media. For example, mail
sent via the U.S. Postal Service is subject to statutory protection prohibiting
its interception (or surveillance) both by private and government actors (with
limited exceptions).”58 Likewise, the Wiretap Act provides similar
protections against the interception of telephone, telegraph, and similar
communications.59 Amendments to the Wiretap Act included in the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) provide similar
protections for computer and information system based data
communications via telecommunications systems while in-transit,60 and
amendments to the Wiretap Act included in the Stored Communications Act
(SCA) provided similar protections (of limited temporal duration) for such
data while at rest.61
This statutory framework—which, subject to various exceptions, applies
both to state and to private actors—implements a general substantive
commitment to the privacy of information being processed for transit (and
in some cases storage) by telecommunications networks.62
5. Federal Consumer Protection Law and the FTC
The Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful unfair and
deceptive trade practices and grants the Federal Trade Commission the
56
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
57
See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 287, 314–17,
324–36 (2014) (comparing the efficacy, in the cybersecurity context, of “[m]anagement-[b]ased
[r]egulatory [d]elegation” to other types of regulation such as “[d]irective [r]egulation”).
58
See 18 U.S.C. § 1701, 1708.
59
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008).
60
H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. (1986).
61
See id. (including the subtitled Stored Communications Act (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2701)).
62
Note, however, that this commitment does not extend to actors who provide the endpoint
equipment, such as a computer provided by an employer or a wireless network provided by an educational
institution.
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authority to bring adjudicatory enforcement procedures against entities who
engage in such practices.63 The FTC has used this authority to engage in a
substantial amount of privacy-related regulatory activities for nearly two
decades.64 The FTC’s scope of enforcement authority is broad with respect
to both the industrial sector and the nature of data or technology, but its
regulatory activities are primarily reactive.65 Furthermore, the FTC’s
participation in regulating privacy and data security activities was a selfgranted power inasmuch as the FTC Act does not in any way expressly
address that authority.66 Other limited authority has, however, been granted
to the FTC by Congress in this regard, such as the regulation of data
collection regarding the online activities of children.67
It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding what substantive privacy
commitments, if any, the FTC Act and the FTC’s privacy and data security
jurisprudence implement. At best, a commitment to preventing deception
regarding privacy practices can be inferred from the Act and the
Commission’s enforcement activities. A broad reading of the scope of the
Commission's enforcement activity might suggest a commitment to
“reasonable” privacy and security practices, but this topic is subject to
substantial debate68 and there is insufficient evidence to conclude it
implements a clear substantive privacy commitment.
6. State Statutory Privacy Privileges
Most U.S. jurisdictions afford special privileges to certain types of
communications between specific parties. These privileges can take the form
of evidentiary privileges (preclusions of the introduction of such
communications during formal adjudicatory or judicial proceedings) and/or
confidentiality requirements on the part of certain parties. The most common
examples include communications with attorneys, psychotherapists (as
separate from other medical practitioners), medical practitioners (to a lesser
degree), and clergy. In most U.S. jurisdictions, these parties both are
required to keep confidential certain information acquired in their
professional capacity and the government is precluded (in most
circumstances) from attempting to acquire that information from the
63

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW AND POLICY (2016).
65
Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note 57, at 336–40; see also Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583,
587 (2014); David Bernard Thaw, Characterizing, Classifying, and Understanding Information Security
Laws and Regulations: Considerations for Policymakers and Organizations Protecting Sensitive
Information Assets (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (May 11, 2011, on file with
the University of California), http://www.davidthaw.com/papers/DavidThawDissertationFinal.pdf
(“Unlike the assessments conceived under traditional management based regulation, FTC-ordered
assessments are reactive in nature instead of proactive.”).
66
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 65, at 598–99.
67
15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (1998).
68
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015).
64
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professional or the individuals they serve. Additionally, while no duty of
confidentiality exists between spouses, the government is prevented from
compelling spouses to disclose information about one another in criminal
matters.
These examples again implement the substantive privacy commitment
to the protection of healthcare and medical information and to the protection
of marital intimacy. Additionally, they describe several other examples, such
as legal advice and spiritual advice, where U.S. law recognizes certain
substantive privacy commitments.
7. State Security Breach Notification Laws
Nearly all U.S. jurisdictions have security breach notification (SBN)
laws which require the custodian of sensitive data or data processor to notify
individuals described in data that custodian holds or processes in the event
this sensitive data becomes compromised by an unauthorized party. The
implementation of these laws varies from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction, but
they all implement an underlying substantive privacy commitment that
individuals are entitled to be informed when certain sensitive data may have
been accessed and/or acquired by an unauthorized party.
C. Overview of E.U. Privacy Regulation
This section provides an overview of E.U. privacy protections parallel
to that in section B.
1. Constitutional Protections
The starting point of privacy protection from a constitutional point of
view is Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union,69 which states the right of respect for private and family life,70 and
Article 8 regarding the protection of personal data.71 They are both positive
rights, and they are identified, unlike in the U.S. Constitution, as
fundamental rights.
Looking at the time when the Charter was issued, however, it is evident
that it comes after many years of privacy legislation in the E.U., both in
69
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7 2010 O.J. C 83/02,
http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/7-respect-private-and-family-life.
70
Id. (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and
communications.”).
71
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8 2010 O.J. C 83/02,
http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/8-protection-personal-data (“1. Everyone has the right to the
protection of personal data concerning him or her . . . . 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified . . . . 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent
authority.”).
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member states—for example France, Denmark, Sweden or Germany—and
in the European community, with Directive 95/46/EC.
To look at an older source of law, Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom was signed
in Rome in 1950, and it establishes the right of respect for private and family
life.72 It is interesting to note that, for the first time, the E.U. has a rule against
unreasonable invasion of privacy “by a public authority” akin to those found
in the United States. Finally, the importance of this rule is underlined in
Article 6, Section 3, of the Treaty on European Union.73
Another issue that must be considered regarding the constitutional
protections of privacy in the E.U. is that the rules just cited do not overwrite
the basic rules provided, for example, by the constitutions of the single
member states. This creates a legal patchwork that needs harmonization74
and implies the use of the directives and subsequent transposition by
member states.
2. Federal Statutory
Information

Protections

Concerning

Processing

of

The most important law, excluding the soon to be enforced General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR),75 is Directive 95/46/EC, enacted in 1995.76
The aim of the Directive is to harmonize the privacy regulations in all
member states by setting out common rules for data protection.
The first effort was to identify, in Article 2, a set of definitions as

72
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7 2010 O.J. C 83/02, supra note
69 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
. . . 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
73
See Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) No. 6655/1/08 REV 1 of Apr. 30, 2008,
art. 6 § 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/default_en.htm (“Fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall
constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”).
74
See D. J. SOLOVE & P. M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1110 (Aspen ed. 2011)
(“This term of European community law refers to formal regulatory attempts to increase the similarity
of legal measures in member states.”).
75
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament & of the Council of 27 April 2016
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=IT.
76
Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
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“personal data,”
“processing of personal data,”
“controller,”79
“processor,”80 and “data subject’s consent.”81 Thus, we may now find a set
of definitions in all privacy laws of member states, even if this set is not
exactly the same of the Directive.
Another important rule is Article 5, regarding the implementation of the
Directive by member states,82 which provides general parameters for the
transposition of the Directive’s provisions by each member state. It is
important because it is another example of the refusal of direct regulation
from central authority.
The Directive includes every possible processing of data, with some
exception for public security, state security, and criminal law. One of the
most important requirements set by the Directive is the duty, for the data
controller, to preliminary inform the data subject on the purposes for which
the data are intended. After the information, with some exceptions, the data
subject must express his or her consent to data processing, especially for data
used for direct marketing or profiling of customers. The data subject also
has a permanent right to monitor and challenge the use of his or her personal
data for all the steps of processing until the lawful destruction of data
themselves.
The Directive, finally, prescribes the creation of a Data Protection
Authority in every member state to supervise the enforcement of the
Directive and of the national privacy regulation.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (effective May 2018)
represents an important change from the nature of previous legal tools used:
while a “Directive” aims to set common objectives and leave to each of the
77
See id. at 8 (“‘[P]ersonal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity[.]”).
78
See id. (“‘[P]rocessing of personal data’ (‘processing’) shall mean any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure
or destruction[.]”).
79
See id. (“‘[C]ontroller’ shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national
or Community law[.]”).
80
See id. (“‘[P]rocessor’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller[.]”).
81
See id. at 9 (“‘[T]he data subject’s consent’ shall mean any freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him
being processed.”).
82
See id. (“Member States shall, within the limits of the provisions of this Chapter, determine more
precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”).
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Member States the form and the method by which the Directive is transposed
into national law, by contrast a “Regulation” is binding in the form is issued.
This means that the Regulation is much less “elastic” in its implementation
than would be a Directive.
Thanks to the GDPR, “[c]onsistent and homogenous application of the
rules for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data should be ensured
throughout the Union,”83 but the GDPR itself leaves some margin of
discretion to the Member States for some specific situations (e.g. for the
processing of sensitive data).
The GDPR, then, is a comprehensive legal text that leaves some limited
topics to be defined by the single states. The domestic Data Protection
Authorities, a supranational organization like the Article 29 Working Party,
or the European Data Protection Supervisor may assist in this process.
In this regard, the ICO issued a guide84 on March 17, 2017 for migrating
to the new General Data Protection Regulation, and the Article 29 Working
Party is publishing several guidelines to help promulgate understanding of
the new or different obligations included into the GDPR.85
3. Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provisions
A good example of the Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provision is
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and
Commission Regulation (E.U.) No. 611/2013 of 24 June 2013 on the
measures applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under
Directive 2002/58/EC. It provides a basic rule for the so-called “unsolicited
communications” by automated telephone calls, faxes, texts and e-mail,
which is the “opt-in” rule. According to Article 13, the data subjects need to
express his or her consent to receive commercial communications regarding
goods or services offered by a company, and they have a permanent right to
“opt-out” and stop the delivering of these communications.
The text of the Directive was amended by Directive 2009/136/EC and
now includes the definition of personal data breach, which means “a breach
of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,
unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or
otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a publicly available
83

Regulation 2016/679, supra note 40, at n.10.
Information Commissioner’s Office, Preparing for the General Data Protection Regulation: 12
Steps to Take Now (May 2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/1624219/preparing-for-the-gdpr-12-steps.pdf.
85
For example, the Article 29 Working Party has already issued guidelines on the right to data
portability, on the designation of a data protection officer and on how to identify a controller or
processor’s lead supervisory authority. Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=50083.
84
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electronic communications service in the Community.”
This Directive, called the ePrivacy Directive, is now undergoing a
reformation process likely to result in a new version sometime in late 2017
or early 2018.87
4. State Statutory Privacy Privileges: The Italy Case
The member states have usually transposed the principles of Directives
95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC with satisfactory compliance. In some cases,
however, states have extended the principles of the Directives by adding
other rules for data processing.
In Italy, for example, the failure to adopt the minimum security
measures88 in data processing is a criminal offense, which can be punished
by detention for up to two years.
Italy has also implemented the steps to be taken following a personal
data breach.89 These steps include notifying the Italian Data Protection
Authority without undue delay and, if the personal data breach is likely to
be detrimental to the personal data or privacy of the contracting party or
another individual, the provider must also notify without delay the breach to
the contracting party or the individual.90
In addition, the notification to the contracting party or individual must
at least include a description of the nature of the personal data breach and
the contact point where additional information can be obtained, and it must
list the measures recommended to mitigate the possible detrimental effects
of the personal data breach.91 The Italian Data Protection Authority, from its
side, may issue a decision containing guidelines and instructions with regard
to the circumstances under which a provider is obliged to notify personal
data breaches, the format of such notification, and the manner in which the
notification is to be made.92
86
Directive 2009/136, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009
Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 on Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer
Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 29.
87
On January 10, 2017 the draft text “Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic
Communications” was issued. Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulationprivacy-and-electronic-communications.
88
Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003 (defining misuses in Section 33 of the Legislative
Decree n.196 of 30 June 2003 as “the minimum security measures . . . in order to ensure a minimum level
of personal data protection.”).
89
See id. (showing Italy’s implementation of an entire data protection code).
90
See id. (requiring the provider of a publicly available communications service to inform
subscribers and, if possible, users about the risk of network security breach).
91
Id. (requiring the provider to also report it to the government’s security data authority).
92
Section 32 of Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003.
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D. U.S. – E.U. Shared Commitments
As discussed in the preceding sections, U.S. and E.U. privacy law have
many textual and structural differences. We begin with a comparative
examination summarizing these differences, and then shift to discuss
commonalities, how those commonalities suggest the plausibility of
procedural harmonization, and how such harmonization is possible
notwithstanding these differences.
Unlike the European Union, privacy law in the United States lacks a
central, unifying framework. There is no general privacy law in the United
States, which comprises rather a patchwork of constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory mechanisms, each giving effect to different privacy protections.
Many of these protections are incidental to other rights.93 The most prevalent
elements of this patchwork includes constitutional protections (express and
implied), federal statutory protections concerning government processing of
information, federal statutory protections concerning sector-specific or
communications-medium specific processing of or access to information,
federal regulatory interpretation of general consumer protection statutes, and
state statutory (evidentiary and other) privacy privileges and breach
notification obligations.94
Most notably, these protections nearly all take the form of negative
liberties—rights precluding a specific actor from taking a specific action.
This starkly contrasts with the E.U. approach, which, as discussed below,
adopts a positive liberties approach including enumerated rights. This
section briefly outlines the protections described above and extrapolates
from those protections a set of common “core commitments” present in U.S.
privacy protections.95
As noted by James Q. Whitman, “we are in the midst of significant
privacy conflicts between the United States and the countries of Western
Europe—conflicts that reflect unmistakable differences in sensibilities about
what ought to be kept ‘private.’”96
In fact, there are different privacy habits between the U.S. and E.U. For
example, discussion of salary and compensation is permitted in the U.S.,
while many E.U. countries frown upon or prohibit disclosure of this
information. Aside from different habits, however, E.U. privacy regulation
is generally more protective for certain kinds of privacy like consumer data,
credit reporting, employees in the workplace, discovery in civil litigation,
93
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (describing the concept of
“penumbras” giving rise to privacy rights inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution).
94
See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 972–79.
95
See id.
96
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151, 1155 (2004).
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dissemination of images of minors, and cameras used in public areas. Some
of these protections, particularly employee and litigation privacy, may strike
Americans as unusual. They are, however, commonplace for for Europeans
and likely well-depict the nature of the U.S.-E.U. substantive privacy
conflict. This conflict has led to many disputes, in particular trade-related
battles, stemming in non-trivial part from these different privacy
perceptions.97
One of the paramount cases about the different view of privacy is the
controversial ECJ’s decision of the “right to be forgotten.”98 While some
U.S. privacy scholars are stating that “[t]his is a form of censorship, one that
would most likely be unconstitutional if attempted in the United States,”99
E.U. privacy scholars are more optimistic because
the positive aspect of this decision is that it induces to
reconsider positively the Article 17 of the EU Proposal for a
General Data Protection Regulation, which is clearer that the
scenario depicted by this decision. This provision admits a
specific exception for freedom of expression and recognizes
the role played by courts and regulatory authorities in deciding
which data must be erased. Finally, it empowers the
Commission to define detailed procedures and solutions to
delete personal information.100
The contrast between these two conceptions of privacy, as noted by
Robert Post, describes a great difference: continental privacy protection is a
form of protection of personal dignity, American privacy protection is a
form of protection of personal liberty.101
Starting from this difference, it is easy to understand why U.S. citizens
are more concerned about privacy invasion by the state, especially within

97
See, e.g., Case C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council & Parliament v. Comm’n, 2015
E.C.J. I-4755 (holding that the arrangements on the transfer of Passenger Name Records of air passengers
from the E.C. to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection were illegal and should be annulled).
98
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2013,
¶ 102.
99
Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A29; see also
Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN (May
13, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-google-must-forget-theeu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten?trk=object-title [] (“[A]lthough recognized in US law, the right to
be forgotten only exists in a few pockets of the law and is nothing compared to the rather dramatic ruling
of the EU Court.”).
100
Alessandro Mantelero, A Few Notes About the Google Case and the Right to Be Forgotten, ICT
L. & DATA PROT. (May 14, 2014), https://ictlawandataprotection.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/a-fewnotes-about-the-google-case-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten/.
101
See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087–95 (2001) (describing
“different and in some respects incompatible concepts of privacy”).
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102

the “sanctity” of their own homes, and E.U. citizens are more concerned
about privacy invasion from the media or corporations.103 It is easy to
understand, similarly, why American privacy law framework is made by
many statutory provisions containing negative rights, as seen in Section II,
and continental privacy framework is more systematically developed
focusing on positive rights.
Notwithstanding these differences, however, this Article advances the
proposition that shared fears of “privacy invasion”—beginning from the
concept of Chilling Effects—make procedural regulatory harmonization
between U.S. and E.U. regimes possible. As noted by Professor Whitman,104
for example:
[I]t would be wrong to say that there is some absolute
difference between American and continental European law.
But the issue is not whether there is an absolute difference. . .
. [I]t is the relative differences that matter. Americans and
Europeans certainly do sometimes arrive at the same
conclusions. Nevertheless, they have different starting points
and different ultimate understandings of what counts as a just
society.
This little excerpt exemplifies this Article and similar others, because despite
the differences we have enumerated above, there are common fears that can
form the foundation of common privacy regulation between the two western
blocs.105 This common foundation can make such regulatory harmonization
usable, effective, and enforceable by the constituent nations and states.
Reaching a unified privacy regulation represents a good opportunity for free
exchange of personal identifiable information, with advantages for trading
and in general free circulation of people and goods.
Even if the perceptions of privacy views are different, U.S. and E.U.
have shared commitments about data protection and data processing. We can
find a form of convergence if we look at the General Data Protection
102
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see Solove, supra note 99 (reporting on the
E.U. Court’s decision to protection citizen’s privacy from being stored permanently).
103
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000).
104
Whitman, supra note 96, at 1163.
105
See GABRIELA ZANFIR, EU AND US DATA PROTECTION REFORMS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 217–
22 (2012) (providing a comparative view of data protection reform projects from the U.S. and the E.U.);
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 1–3 (2013); Kenneth
Bamberger & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 247–
54 (2011) (reporting findings from studies of corporate privacy managers); Francesca Bignami,
European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48
B.C.L. REV. 609, 682–683 (2007). Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States,
the EU and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 357–60 (2005)
(suggesting, as a compromise, the Canadian approach to privacy and personal information regulation).
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Regulation (GDPR) and specific U.S. law such as the Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights. Some differences still exist,106 but both approaches would provide
accountable and effective safeguards for individuals and consumers against
the rapid evolution of technology, surveillance, profiling techniques, and
both reforms look forward to “a more protected individual [and consumer]
and a more responsible data controller or data processor.”107 While not
formally codified into U.S. law, this comparative example lends support to
the proposition that certain common goals underlie both U.S. and E.U.
privacy regulation.
Yes, differences in privacy regulation between the U.S. and E.U. will
likely remain. This is why we believe that the answer to a unified privacy
regulation cannot derive from convergence of existing laws but rather
requires a new, bottom-up approach, using Management-Based Regulatory
Delegation (or “Federated Regulation”) theory applied to federalist systems
of governance. We call this application Market-Supervised Regulatory
Delegation.
III. COMMON GROUND IN U.S. AND E.U. BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION:
UNIFYING PRIVACY REGULATION—“MARKET-SUPERVISED REGULATORY
DELEGATION”
Market-Supervised Regulatory Delegation presents a theoretical
framework in which nation-parties to a multi-lateral agreement consent to
limited general principles and a common enforcement procedure, and then
implement those principles into law—while each still retains substantial
ability to implement their own national policy choices. Private actors are
free to choose in which nations to conduct business,108 but that choice is no
longer dominated by the transaction cost of varying regulatory compliance

106

The main difference is the broad scope of the Regulation compared with the narrow scope of the

CPBR.
107

ZANFIR, supra note 105, at 217, 222.
This method also is superior to current policy in that current (and recent) policy frameworks,
such as the former U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor and the new U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield fail to give effect to
respective nations’ privacy protections. In practice, these agreements merely require data processors
established in the U.S. to certify that they comply with the Principles defined to meet the E.U. data
protection safeguards. See Requirements of Participation, PRIVACY SHIELD PROGRAM,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Requirements-of-Participation (last visited Mar. 1, 2017)
(requiring public commitment by corporation to abide by the Privacy Shield Principles). Clever names
notwithstanding, these agreements do not effectively extend E.U. member states’ protections to the
processing of data of E.U. citizens within the United States for companies participating in the Privacy
Shield. Some criticisms in that sense were expressed by the Article 29 Working Party. See Statement,
Article 29 Working Party, Statement on the Decision of the European Commission on the EU-US Privacy
Shield (July 26, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/pressrelease/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_shield_en.pdf (“It
also remains unclear how the Privacy Shield Principles shall apply to processors.”).
108
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109

procedures.
Rather, the dominant factor in the choices by market
participants to conduct business in a given nature is the substantive policy
choices of that nation. This allows the market to express global preferences
without intruding on the sovereign power of nations to make local policy
decisions (albeit informed by—and perhaps even pressured by—such global
market forces).
This Section builds upon the work in Sections I and II to propose a
method for unifying the process of administering U.S. and E.U. privacy
regulation by applying concepts of Federated Regulation (ManagementBased Regulatory Delegation) theory to cross-jurisdictional privacy
management. Such an approach establishes a regime under which
aspirational goals are laid out by the legislative bodies (i.e., protection
against “chilling effects” through a list of enumerated positive privacy
“rights”), which then require the individual jurisdictions to prescribe
(through their respective administrative processes) that regulated entities
develop compliance plans to achieve these aspirational goals. By
standardizing the compliance process, transaction costs for multi-national
organizations to operate in multiple jurisdictions are lowered. While various
jurisdictions may require more stringent privacy protections, the
standardized compliance process facilities organizations’ ability to make
market-based choices regarding the jurisdictions in which to operate.
The result becomes a system under which each sovereign nation retains
the ability to select those privacy norms they wish to enforce, and leaves
more to market function the choices both of consumers and multi-national
organizations the jurisdictions in which they wish to operate. This is
accomplished by the application of a form of process-based standards
regulation known as Federated Regulation (a form of Management-Based
Regulatory Delegation). When applied across nations, we describe this
concept as Supervised Market-Based Regulation.
A. Federated Regulation (Management-Based Regulatory Delegation)
Federated Regulation (also known as Management-Based Regulatory
Delegation) is a theory for engaging private expertise in regulation both on
the “front-end” (rulemaking) and on the “back-end” (compliance).110 It
109
Anecdotal evidence, such as the choice of many multi-national corporations to operate in Ireland,
suggests a race-to-the-bottom among corporations operating in the E.U. to select the nation with the
lowest-transaction-cost compliance procedures as their base of operations. As of the time of this writing,
the authors are unaware of any comprehensive empirical study in this regard, and suggest such
quantitative analysis as worthwhile future work.
110
See Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note 57 at 324–26 (describing
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation as having two collaborative parts; the promulgation of
aspirational goals by the legislators followed by the industry experts drafting compliance plans to achieve
said goals).
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combines Kenneth Bamberger's theory of regulatory delegation in
rulemaking111 with Cary Coglianese and David Lazer's112 theory of
management-based regulation for compliance to describe a process which
engages private expertise both to draft regulations and to allow private
entities to manage their own compliance process. This process has been very
successful in engaging private expertise to manage healthcare privacy and
cybersecurity in the United States.113 Under this model, legislatures establish
an organic statutory framework that calls upon an administrative agency to
develop regulations in conjunction with the entities subject to that regulation
(and other relevant stakeholders). The regulations then promulgated by the
agency, rather than defining strict standards for compliance, instead, lay out
general or aspirational goals for regulated entities to achieve. Entities then
are required to develop compliance plans which reasonably achieve those
goals, and to follow their own plans. This last step becomes the primary
compliance objective, subject to regulatory agency oversight for
reasonableness of the plans and entities' adherence to those plans.114
Federated Regulation suggests a model both applicable to a harmonized
privacy compliance process itself, and to relationships between nations and
a harmonized process. The sections that follow discuss its use in these two
regards.
B. Federated Regulation Supports National Coordination Toward
Harmonized Privacy Processes
Perhaps the greatest challenge of harmonizing any aspect of E.U. and
U.S. privacy regulation is the vast differences in normative conceptions of
privacy among the constituent nations.115 Federated Regulation presents one
option successful at reconciling heterogeneous values into a single,
functioning regulatory system.116 Applying this approach to developing a
harmonized privacy compliance regime across the U.S. and E.U. member
nations presents an approach capable of developing more efficacious
outcomes than the current much-criticized E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield
111
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 386 (2006) (describing the delegation of
regulatory authority to private firms).
112
See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 692, 725 (2003) (describing
management-based regulation).
113
See Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, supra note 22, 377 (presenting evidence supporting
the use of private regulatory capture for public benefit).
114
See id. at 362–63 (discussing how HIPAA permits covered entities to develop compliance plans
conforming to its specific needs but while also penalizing for deficiencies in compliance plans).
115
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 105.
116
See Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, supra note 22, at 367 (“Thus rather than driving
toward a least-common-denominator rule, individual parties are incentivized to cooperate with one
another as much as possible.”).
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Agreement .
Under such an approach, a multi-lateral treaty would take the place of
organic legislation in the Federated Regulation structure described in
Section A.118 This multi-lateral treaty would lay out aspirational goals of two
forms. First, the common value of preventing privacy invasions from
causing chilling effects establishes a baseline for drafting aspirational
privacy goals. Second, these goals would be described in a common baseline
set of positive enumerated privacy rights from the perspective of individual
citizens. By focusing on positive (rather than negative) liberties, the need
universally to define against which actors individuals must be protected is
substantially reduced.
Rather, the “feared actors” are defined individually at the national level.
Here the nations themselves take the place of the regulated entities in
adopting “compliance plans” through national legislation that implements at
least the core values enumerated in a multi-lateral treaty. Each nation retains
its sovereign freedom to determine against which actors those rights need
most strongly to be enforced to prevent the common concern of chilling
effects, and each nation likewise remains free to implement additional
protections.
This approach has appeal both for those who believe in the marketplace
of ideas as best-equipped to resolve normative differences, as well as for
those who believe that individual nations should retain sovereign power to
make determinations affecting their own citizens' rights. By harmonizing
compliance procedures, procedural-based transaction costs for
organizations to operate in new jurisdictions are substantially reduced.
While substantive-based transaction costs remain—such as an organization
reassessing its information classification policy to accommodate a type of
information protected as “sensitive” or “private” in a new nation, but not
elsewhere—those transaction costs are exactly the types of costs the market
should capture. Reducing procedural transaction costs shifts increased focus
in market-participant decisions to substantive differences in privacy and data
protection policies among nations, allowing the market to express global
preferences regarding those policies.
Unlike command-and-control regulatory models, however, such as air
pollution control regulation,119 these policies respect the substantive choices
of individual nations. By acknowledging the base levels of similarity
described in Section II of this Article, the general and aspirational privacy
goals articulated in a multi-lateral treaty would minimize imposition of base117
See David Cole and Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States,
the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 220, 220–
237 (2016).
118
See supra Section III.A.
119
Regulation 443/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140) (providing emissions standards with sanctions for
manufacturers that fail to meet them).
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level substantive choices. While necessary to impose procedural and
enforcement commonalities, such imposition under this flexible theoretical
framework can provide substantial accommodation for substantive
differences. While this approach does require accepting a functional and
non-trivial distinction between procedural and substantive matters, in terms
of the practicalities of privacy compliance procedures, such a distinction is
not as challenging to accept as in other areas such as criminal justice.120
There are additional benefits to this approach as well, particularly if the
procedural compliance mechanism agreed upon by the nations also uses the
Federated Regulation model. Similar to the legislative debate process, the
requirement that regulated entities develop compliance plans brings the issue
being regulated into the risk analysis conversation at the executive
management level within organizations.121 Likewise, the Market-Supervised
Regulatory Delegation model encourages similar debates in the national
legislatures as they take steps to implement the general and aspirational
goals required of them in the multi-lateral agreement.
Interestingly, the E.U. already appears to be using a process similar to
Federated Regulation for certain pieces of legislation, for example issuing a
public consultation on mobile health regulation.122
C. Federated Regulation for Standardizing Compliance by Regulated
Entities
The approach to harmonizing certain core values described in section B
also suggests a process for privacy compliance that nations implementing
the core values of the treaty can employ. The treaty could require that nations
use a Federated Regulation approach, whereby whichever entities—public
or private—each nation chose to limit the privacy invasions of would be
required to develop compliance plans to achieve the specific privacy
120
Substance-procedure distinctions can be particularly challenging in the context of criminal
justice. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) (discussing the difficulties of
distinguishing between procedural and substantive rules in criminal law and procedure); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (same). This can be compared with the debated, but more readily accepted,
distinction in U.S. administrative law, which recognizes the tension between but expressly requires
distinction among procedural and substantive rules. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A) (exempting from
rulemaking procedures “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice) (emphasis added); see also
Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1990); JEM Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gary Lawson, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 365–
375 (6th ed. 2013).
121
Smith et al., supra note 51; see also Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note
57, at 367 (“The risk analysis and implementation details of information security are highly technical. It
is nearly impossible for senior managers, charged with overseeing the operations of an entire
organization, to maintain the knowledge necessary to correct their subordinates’ mistakes.”).
122
Public Consultation on the Green Paper on Mobile Health, DIG. SINGLE MKT.,
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/public-consultation-green-paper-mobile-health
(last
updated May 3, 2016, 2:45 PM).
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protections laid out by that nation.
Such an approach presents a substantial advantage for transnational
organizations and transnational information flow. If the privacy compliance
process is the same in all nations for an organization, while it still may need
to vary some of the variables across nations—a non-trivial business cost—
a similar process substantially reduces compliance costs, particularly when
the baseline for developing a privacy compliance plan begins with a
common set of baseline criteria shared by all nations.
Lastly, it is important to note that this analysis is not a panacea, nor does
it address all privacy problems. As we discuss throughout this Article, one
of the potential failings of previous attempts has been the effort to solve too
many (irreconcilable) problems concurrently. As noted by Professor Peter
Swire, both markets and governments are limited in their ability to address
privacy concerns comprehensively, particularly as a function of the barriers
consumers face to expressing privacy preferences in the market or
politically.123 This proposal attempts to ease the burdens of expressing
privacy protections at a macro-level, allowing nations to express preferences
within a framework and letting the market sort out those preferences. It
certainly is not an answer, but rather represents a possible move toward
rethinking the structure of cross-border data flows in a manner which
reduces procedural transaction costs and focuses market response more on
substantive costs.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION
One of the greatest challenges in giving effect to international
agreements is the general proposition in many nations that the head-of-state
(in the U.S., the President) has the unilateral authority to negotiate—and
often therefore re-negotiate—the foreign policy of the nation at will. In the
United States, presidential power in foreign affairs is nearly plenary, with
the only constitutional requirement for inter-branch involvement being
ratification of Treaties (but not lesser agreements) by the U.S. Senate.
As a practical matter, however, giving effect to international agreements
in the United States often requires Congressional action beyond any required
ratification.124 If the agreement involves financial appropriation, for
example, Congressional action may be required. If the agreement involves
domestic policy within the scope of the traditional Article I powers,
Congressional action likewise may be required.
Additionally, as noted above, the presidential power in U.S. foreign
affairs nearly is plenary—and thus agreements are vulnerable to the shifting
123

Peter W. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of
Personal Information 14–15 (1997), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11472.
124
See Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the
U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1007 (2014) (describing how Congress has unilaterally
withdrawn the U.S. from international agreements after declining to ratify them).
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political winds of the current Executive. This is a particularly salient concern
in an era which has seen such politically-sharp transitions as the U.S.
Presidential elections of 2008 and 2016, both of which constituted electoral
outcomes representing substantial shifts in foreign policy.
Privacy, by contrast, is not a concept well-suited to frequent change.
Individuals make decisions based on some reasonable degree of reliance that
the choices they make regarding provision of information will not
subsequently be undermined as a function of downstream changes in policy.
Considering the volume of information shared globally in a modern
information society, it is not reasonable to expect that individuals will have
the ability to control and retract each information provision they previously
made. Likewise, it is not reasonable to expect that organizations—
particularly for-profit private businesses—will have the capacity to build in
the level of information density required to give effect to that level of version
control.125
Thus, any international agreement, whether formally a treaty under U.S.
constitutional standards, should be backed by federal legislation. Such
legislation not only should create a statutory framework to ensure
implementation of the agreement, but also should create “speed bumps” to
ensure that any future changes do not easily reverse the reliance created
among organizations and individuals on privacy choices which are difficult
to reverse with adequate precision once made.
While this Article does not propose specific language for such action,
we do provide a general framework sketch of one possible approach for
implementing Federated Regulation to create a Market-Supervised
Regulatory approach to U.S.-E.U. cross-border data flows. The core of such
a framework would be a binding agreement between the U.S. and the E.U.
which would include a set of basic positive assertions regarding definitions
of sensitive information and data protection measures. Existing U.S. and
E.U. laws do differ, in these respects, but the primary U.S. definitions of
personally-identifiable information could serve as a definitional baseline of
what is protected, and the primary E.U. requirements in the General Data
Protection Regulation126 could serve as a baseline of the methods of
protection. These would form minimal requirements, and would become part
of the implementing statutory frameworks in both U.S. and E.U.
implementing legislation.
Building on this framework, which would allow for a basic degree of
interoperability, a set of aspirational goals—areas to be addressed—could
125
To be clear, we do not argue that businesses should not be expected to provide customized
privacy settings. This, as argued by many other privacy scholars, both is a reasonable expectation and
likely is in the market interests of many private actors. Such customization is, however, a scientificallydistinct concept from the highly-precise version control required to address the risks of unanticipated
political change possible under contemporary approaches to foreign affairs.
126
See generally Regulation 2016/679, supra note 40.
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be defined as part of the international agreement. That agreement and the
implementing statutes would then require each respective nation to consider
those areas and decide—within its own political process—which additional
protections (if any) to afford in the context of what data would be protected,
to what degree, subject to what exceptions, and through what methods.
The agreement and implementing legislation also would specify that
compliance would be achieved through a common framework. Again
borrowing from the concepts of Federated Regulation, the regulatory
compliance goal for each entity would be to develop a plan which addressed
both the general foundational areas as well as the “additional” areas of any
nation in which the entity operated. While this would create additional
transaction cost as a function of substantive protections, the transaction cost
of operating in an additional nation would be minimal as a function of
compliance cost, since the same methods of demonstrating compliance
would apply.
The goal here is not to achieve substantive convergence nor is it to
reduce substantive compliance costs. Rather, it is to allow the function of
the market and the political process to sort out which private protections
apply. A regime of this nature would preclude a “race-to-the-bottom” as
some argue currently occurs in the E.U., and likewise would close the “black
hole” of the Safe Harbor/Privacy Shield. If a nation’s privacy protections
become “too costly” and organizations elect not to conduct business there,
that nation’s political process would be faced with the choice of revising
their protections or losing access to international services. Likewise, nations
no longer could serve as safe havens for lower privacy protections below
what would ordinarily be demanded by the market or by political processes.
CONCLUSION
Privacy in cross-border data flows is one example of a larger problem.
Much like the challenge of the radio spectrum, privacy of postal mail,
wiretapping, and early Internet questions, over time societal and market
developments will change the nature and scope of the problem. What will
remain constant is the need for theoretical frames through which
policymakers can develop regulatory frameworks for dealing with rapidly
changing technology. The historical examples listed above, and many others
discussed in related jurisprudence and scholarship both in the U.S. and the
E.U., demonstrate well the accelerating trend of technological change
outpacing legal and policy processes.
This outpacing is not inherently evil, as the law does (and arguably
should) respond carefully, contemplatively, and with care—all things to
which speed is anathema. Yet rapidly-developing technology remains. What
then must a society do? This Article presents the concept of MarketSupervised Regulatory Delegation as a method of allowing policymaking to
embrace the market—which will continue to develop regardless of the speed
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at which the law responds—and rather than distorting market outcomes, seek
to enhance the degree to which the market expresses preferences across
nations with differing normative priors but where the question at issue is
inherently internetworked, and therefore international.
Stated far more simply—this proposal allows the market to function,
preserves national sovereignty, without sacrificing the benefits of
international trade. We hope others will critically examine, critique, build
upon, and improve it as a potential approach for international regulation of
complex, rapidly-changing technological markets.
Finally, we note that in the specific context of privacy and cross-border
data flows, this Article is exploratory and seeks to lay out a theoretical
framework. That framework considers whether it is possible to harmonize
the process of privacy compliance in different regimes without having to
reach agreement on all aspects of the substance of that regulation. Such a
distinction does not ignore the well-established debate over whether
procedural and substantive rules can be differentiated, but rather elects the
assumption that they can and explores whether doing so may yield fruit to
improve a currently undesirable and inefficient regulatory outcome. We
recognize that this proposal is far from a policy directive, but hope that its
framework encourages policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to
consider new perspectives both on what should be the goals of cross-border
data flow policy and what styles of regulatory frameworks can be employed
to achieve those goals.

